Extraordinary sitting, and extraordinary result?
Yesterday’s (19 August 2026) Extraordinary Sitting of the National Assembly of Bhutan was matched with extraordinary results. In what may qualify as an unprecedented outcome in Bhutan’s young and fledgling democracy, Hon’ble Tempa Dorji, Member of Parliament from Maenbi-Tshenkhar constituency won 24 votes from the full attendance 47-seat National Assembly to become the Speaker. Hon’ble Tandin Wangchuk, Member of Parliament from Athang-Thedtsho constituency secured 23 votes. What made the result unprecedented and observers more excited is that Hon’ble Tempa was the candidate of the opposition party, Bhutan Tendrel Party (BTP). Hon’ble Tandin was nominated by the ruling party, People’s Democratic Party (PDP). Interestingly, he was holding a cabinet berth in the capacity of Minister for the Ministry of Health at the time of election. PDP has 31 seats and BTP 16 seats in the National Assembly. The Extraordinary Sitting was convened after Hon’ble Lungten Dorji, Member of Parliament of Panbang constituency stepped down from the Speakership citing leadership reorganisation of his party amidst ongoing ministerial reshuffle and resignations. Hon’ble Lungten is a member of the ruling party, PDP.
Hon’ble Tempa’s victory came about with possible defections of 8 members from the ruling party, if they were expected to vote along the party lines. Till date, including for the last three democratically elected parliaments, first (2008-2013), second (2013-2018) and third (2018-2023), all Speakers had been from the ruling party. Indeed, all Deputy Speakers as well. It has become an established trend to have political parties nominate candidates for a Speaker and a Deputy Speaker. The ruling party by virtue of having the majority in the National Assembly, got their nominees elected for the two positions.
This time, the result was unexpected. Some quarters of social media literati went on to equate the win with no confidence vote to the government, and a dawn of a new era. Following the past trends, it is not unreasonable to argue that the opposition party themselves did not expect their nominee to win. But it did.
I choose not to analyse specific factors, individually. Perhaps, a point for deeper introspection, I will approach from the system perspective. All eight alleged defections, holding on to an assumption that there were no reverse defections, did not defect as a bloc, as it is largely being put. If they were expected to demonstrate the party loyalty and follow the party lines, their reasons could be distinct from one other. For some, the roots for defection may be traced back to early 2024 which the opposition party took advantage of.
Moving past the election result, the public discussion including heightened interest surrounding ruling and opposition parties drew me to revisit our constitutional and legislative frameworks. Unity is much spoken of as a value and societal aspiration among Bhutanese. However, phrases such as ‘opposition party has risen to Speakership’ does not sit well with such societal aspirations, particularly when the spirit and intent of the laws including the Constitution are grander and plural. The case in point is an apparent divergence between intent/spirit on one hand and conduct/practice on the other regarding the election of a Speaker and a Deputy Speaker. I reproduce constitutional provisions and relevant acts to provide context of my interpretation, and recommendation as to how we may be able to have a less-partisan electoral process pertaining to a Speaker and a Deputy Speaker.
First, Article 12.3 of the Constitution, enshrines,
“At the first sitting after any general election, or when necessary to fill a vacancy, the National Assembly shall elect a Speaker and a Deputy Speaker from among its members.”
Second, Section, 37.1 of the National Assembly (Amendment) Act of Bhutan 2014, provides,
“Any member may submit a nomination of a member for the post of the Speaker in the House. The nomination shall be seconded by another member and accompanied by a statement by the nominee that he or she is willing to serve as the Speaker.”
Third, Section 37 of the National Assembly Act of the Kingdom of Bhutan, 2008, states,
“At the first sitting after any general election, or when necessary to fill a vacancy, the National Assembly shall elect a Speaker and a Deputy Speaker from among its members.”
A note for reference. The 2008 Act has been amended, and the 2014 Act is in force.
In all of the above provisions, it does not require ‘a political party to nominate their candidate/nominee’. The provisions around parties, rather, are silent. Indeed, the 2014 National Assembly Act clearly states that the nomination to be seconded by ‘another member’, not a party. Accordingly, the National Assembly, in its press release, notes, “Nomination sought from among the members of the National Assembly.” However, it was the two political parties who nominated the two candidates; hence, the two camps of the ruling and the opposition. As yesterday’s election result revealed, any number outside the numbers of seats a party occupies, is labeled as ‘defection’, ‘crossing party-lines’, raising questions around unexamined loyalty which are not necessarily healthy discussion if we are to consider merit and competency in the realm of party politics. In doing so, our ‘practice did not meet the intent’.
If it is not for anti-incumbency, random comments from observers and social media literati appear to be content with the election result. Then, would there be a way to make a Speaker’s election less partisan and divisive? The existing constitutional and subsidiary legal provisions, indeed, are intended to have a more plural and less partisan electoral process. The Speaker ought to be sitting above the party lines. The hitherto experience, at least the public facing and engagement aspects demonstrated neutrality of the Chair. Why cannot we start the process from a neutral vantage point?
Building on the constitutional framework, Section 37.1 of the 2014 National Assembly Act clearly spells that the nominee shall be seconded by ‘another member’, not a political party. Therefore, the National Assembly Secretariat or an agency conducting the elections of a Speaker and a Deputy Speaker could, in the strictest sense of the spirit and intent of the law, require only members to nominate their candidates. It would have three visible benefits. First, it would uphold the spirit and intent of the law to be more plural and less partisan or divisive. Even if members are expected to toe a party line, the sense of obligation to another member would not be as strong as one would have to a party’s nominee. As a result, there should be less question on betrayal and defection particularly when the decision concerns independence and national interests that ought to supersede the party interests. Second, members of the parliament can exercise more agency and independence. The current practice only breeds discussion around unexamined loyalty, defection and breach of trust (to the party) if a member would have exercised based on merit and competence. Third, right from the start, the Speaker (would be), having not formally/officially taken the route through the party cadres, would have more independence in her or his discharge of duties. This is not to suggest that the current party-led nomination process has undermined independence and neutrality the Chair warrants.
The convention of electing a Speaker elsewhere, especially in the House of Commons, the United Kingdom, known for the origin of the Westminster System, is noteworthy. Nomination starts with at least 12 members nominating a candidate. It is members, not parties, that starts the process. The neutrality and independence of the Chair has stood the test of time and circumstances. The convention and respect for the speaker is captured in the phrase, ‘once a speaker, always a speaker’. Reading the legislative intent of our constitutional framework and subsidiary laws, it follows the spirit of established convention elsewhere. We often pride ourselves that as a late comer we have the privilege of learning from others who experimented before us. In the election of a Speaker and a Deputy Speaker too, we can revisit our practice, and perhaps realign with the original intent of our constitutional and legislative frameworks.
